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We report diagnosis and management of the first laboratory-confirmed case of coronavirus 
disease 2019 (COVID-19) hospitalized in Toronto, Canada. No healthcare-associated 
transmission occurred.  In the face of a potential pandemic of COVID-19, we suggest sustainable 





On December 31st 2019, China alerted the World Health Organization about a cluster of cases of 
pneumonia of unknown origin in Wuhan, Hubei, China (1).  One week later, a novel coronavirus 
(provisional name: 2019-nCoV; definitive name: SARS-CoV-2) was identified as the causative 
agent of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). As of February 28th, 2020, the outbreak has 
spread due to human-to-human transmission throughout China, and to over fifty countries (2).  
While the majority of transmission has occurred in community settings, super-spreading 
events in healthcare settings have already been described.  In a Wuhan hospital, a nosocomial 
acquisition is suspected among 29% of healthcare workers (HCW) and 12.3% of the 138 
hospitalized patients infected (2). A patient admitted with unrecognized symptoms of the 
infection was reported to transmit the virus to more than 10 HCWs.  
Our hospital in Toronto, Canada, has past experience caring for patients with SARS-CoV-
1 where the majority of cases were healthcare-associated (3).  We now report the first imported 
case of COVID-19 hospitalized in Canada while emphasising the control measures applied based 
on lessons learned from SARS.   
 
Case presentation  
On January 23rd 2020, a 56-year old man presented to our hospital Emergency Department in 
Toronto with a new onset of fever and non-productive cough following return from Wuhan, 
China the day prior (4). Based on high suspicion for COVID-19, throat and mid-turbinate swabs 
(FLOQ Swab by Copan, with UTM transport media) were collected.  On clinical assessment, the 
patient remained well without ever requiring supplemental oxygen.  The chest-x-ray confirmed 
the presence of pneumonia (4).  The patient was admitted to hospital for close observation and 
supportive management, considering early reports of respiratory failure due to COVID-19 (1).  
4 
 
The specimens collected were negative for influenza A and B, parainfluenza, respiratory 
syncytial virus, adenovirus and human metapneumovirus. Coronavirus was detected in both mid-
turbinate and throat swab by pancoronavirus RNA dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) PCR and 
confirmed as SARS-CoV-2 by sequencing (5). 
On the inpatient unit, the patient remained stable.   Symptom duration and viral studies are 
summarized in Figure 1.  Following resolution of fever for 48-hours, the patient was discharged 
home on day 8 of hospital stay.  Public health followed up with his wife at home who had cough 
only. She was also confirmed to have COVID-19.  Both patients recovered fully with home 




All specimens were received at Public Health Ontario Laboratory and eluted in universal 
transport media (Copan,Italia, Brescia, IT)).  Total nucleic acid extraction of all primary 
specimens was performed using a NucliSens easyMAG extraction system instrument 
(bioMérieux Canada Inc., Québec, Canada), according to the manufacturer’s instructions. 
Reverse transcription and endpoint PCR was performed using hemi nested pan-CoV primers 
targeting the RdRp (5), and additional primers from this protocol adapted to be SARS-CoV-2 
specific.  Once validated for clinical testing, specimens were also tested using a published real-
time PCR protocol targeting the envelope (E) and nucleoprotein (N) genes (6). Presumptive 
confirmation was obtained after detection of two gene targets by real-time PCR, or PCR and 
Sanger sequencing of the RdRp gene. Confirmation was conducted by the National Microbiology 
Laboratory (NML) of the Public Health Agency of Canada by using a Real-time PCR assay 
targeting the N gene (developed at NML). Conventional RT- PCR assay targeting the RdRp was 
5 
 
modified from elsewhere (7) and ORF3a (developed at NML) was also performed. Nucleotide 
analysis of the partial gene sequences of RdRp and ORF3a amplicons showed that they were 
more closely related to COVID-2019.  
 
Infection prevention and control management 
Based on presence of respiratory symptoms and travel history elicited at triage, this patient was 
immediately placed in private negative pressure room with airborne-droplet-contact precautions 
as per our screening protocol for novel high-consequence pathogens.  The personal protective 
equipment (PPE) used included a long-sleeved gown, a pair of gloves, a fit-tested N95 respirator 
and a face-shield.  The patient was cared for by the usual medical and nursing teams in the 
emergency department and on the unit.  Since the PPE used is familiar to our hospital staff and no 
additional components used (eg. hood or powered air-purifying respirator), no specific training 
was undertaken other than audits to ensure correct donning and doffing technique.   
Additional administrative control measures were put in place given the inherent risks of a 
novel high-consequence pathogen.  First, we maintained a log of each healthcare worker involved 
in the patient’s care.  Second, we limited the number of individuals entering the isolation room to 
the most essential healthcare workers.  For example, no visitors were allowed for the patient who 
were instead provided the option of using telephone communication.  Disposable trays were used 
to avoid the need to enter and collect food items.  Third, all equipment including vital signs 
machine were dedicated to this patient only. Finally, the critical care and code blue team were 
alerted on admission of the patient location and the need to abide to hospital policy for 
minimizing the risks of aerosol-generating medical procedures (AGMP).  It was agreed upon by 
the clinical teams that should the patient require increasing supplemental oxygen, there would be 
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a low threshold to intubate using controlled and protected procedures including use of paralytics, 
video laryngoscopy, and PPE including N95 masks (8).   
 Following the patient’s discharge, terminal cleaning of the patient’s room was completed 
twice using 0.5% hydrogen peroxide.  An IPAC professional and an Environmental Services 
Supervisor audited both stages of the room cleaning.  The list of healthcare workers involved in 
the patient’s care was shared with occupational health and safety, who were to immediately 
notify IPAC of any new reported specific or non-specific influenza-like illness within 14-days of 
discharge.  By February 28th 2020, there were no probable or confirmed cases of COVID-19 
among other patients or healthcare workers in the facility.  
 
Discussion 
We report a case of COVID-19 which was identified immediately and using transmission-based 
precautions, monitoring and administrative controls was safely cared for with no healthcare 
associated transmission. 
 While we expect many more cases of COVID-19 as this epidemic evolves, this first case 
highlights significant progress made since the SARS outbreak in our own hospital back in 2003.  
There were 375 cases of SARS throughout Toronto during this prior outbreak of which 271 
resulted from healthcare-associated transmission (3).  Following this event, additional resources 
in IPAC and public health were instituted in Canada to improve preparedness for managing high-
consequence pathogens (9, 10).  The key differences in preparedness and capacities at our 
hospital between SARS and COVID-19 epidemics are summarized in Table 1.    
Additional lessons learned were applied in the management of this patient with COVID-
19.  First, we did not rely on a specific dedicated team, but instead built on IPAC capacities 
already in place among our usual staffing model that includes baseline preparedness of 
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management of novel high-consequence pathogens.  This approach differed from SARS as well 
as Ebola in 2014, where many hospitals developed dedicated teams to care for these patients, 
which required significant investments in human resources and training (11).  In the aftermath of 
those epidemics, this approach was difficult to sustain for hospitals resulting in loss of 
preparedness.  Second, what allows our hospital to maintain baseline preparedness for novel 
high-consequence pathogens is that our standard PPE for managing these patients only includes 
components that are already familiar to our HCWs.  This decision was made based on evidence 
demonstrating that additional PPE complexity is associated with risks of self-contamination 
during doffing (12). This approach is also consistent with prior evidence from SARS-CoV-1 
suggesting that transmission occurs by the droplet or contact route (13).  Finally, we instituted 
administrative controls for preventing super-spreading events around AGMP (3, 8). While our 
patient did not end up requiring any AGMP, coordinated communication and planning was in 
place to ensure these would be performed in a controlled fashion to minimize HCW risk.  
 When to discharge this patient was a decision that required us to carefully balance the risk 
that a stable patient who is yet early in the COVID-19 illness with potential to require medical 
intervention (2), against the ongoing risk of HCW exposure with each additional day of inpatient 
care.  On the other hand, promoting early discharge of this patient might have resulted in transfer 
back to hospital if he deteriorated leading to additional risk of exposure during transport. We 
urgently need to develop evidence-based risk stratification of patients with COVID-19 to 
determine those best managed at home rather than in hospital as part of our strategy to keeping 
the number of exposures to a minimum.  
 How long patients with COVID-19 remain infectious represents a significant gap in our 
understanding.  Our patient’s symptoms lasted 13 days but viral shedding continued until day 28.  
Current CDC and Ontario’s Ministry of Health recommendations are to maintain isolation until 2 
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negative repeat testing of respiratory tract specimens (14), pending more definitive assessment of 
bioaerosol studies.   
 Our report has important limitations.  First, it represents the experiences of a single 
healthcare institution and public health unit around a single case, compared to the large number 
of patients being concurrently managed in the epicentre of the outbreak in Hubei province, China.  
Second, our patient remained stable and did not require any AGMP which would have increased 
the risk of transmission substantially.  Finally, our patient presented quite typically and identified 
based on travel history; however, countries where local transmission has already occurred must 
relay on syndromic screening alone which may be more challenging given reports that some 
patients with COVID-19 may present atypically (2).  
In the face of an impending pandemic of COVID-19, the diagnosis and management of 
this first Canadian case provides hope that we can limit the burden of healthcare-associated 
infection seen during SARS.  We call for scalable and sustainable preparedness for COVID-19 
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Table 1. Differences between 2003 and 2020 in preparedness for a novel coronavirus at a 
large academic hospital in Toronto, Canada.  
 2003: 
SARS in Toronto* 
2020: 
COVID-19 Toronto case 
Public health structures and infrastructures 
Adequate funding and human resources No Yes 
Protocols for information sharing among 
different levels of government 
No Yes 
Link between public health and hospitals Weak, Fragmented, 
Uncoordinated 
Coordination and information 
sharing present 
Rapid and accurate diagnostic testing No Yes 
IPAC program structure and related hospital program 
ICP staffing level Understaffed 
3 ICP for 1257 total beds  
(0.23 ICP/100 beds) 
Adequate 
13 ICP for 1355 total beds 
(0.96 ICP/100 beds) 
ICP certification (Certification Board of 
Infection Control and Epidemiology) 
Not universal Required  
Occupational Health & Safety Disconnected from IPAC  Coordinated with IPAC 
IPAC administrative controls 
Syndromic triage in ED No Yes 
Febrile respiratory illness surveillance No Yes 




Droplet & contact precaution; 
If COVID-19 suspected or 
confirmed: airborne, droplet & 
contact 
Awareness of super-spreading events and 
individuals 
No Yes 
Minimizing AGMP and Protected intubation 
policies 
No Yes 
Hand hygiene program No Yes 
Healthy Workplace Policy (Work restrictions 
for HCW with acute infectious symptoms) 
No Yes 
Presence of a Pandemic plan No Yes 
Engineering and environmental controls 
Number of airborne infection isolation room  20 (0 in ED) 
 
46 (8 in ED)  
ED infrastructure Shared air system; No 
protective barrier at triage 
 Isolated air system with 
negative pressure in each zone;  
Protective barrier at triage  
Terminal disinfection completed twice at 
patient discharge for high-consequence 
pathogen 
No Yes 
Personal protective equipment (PPE) 
Regular N95 fit-testing of HCW No Yes 
Clear recommendation on PPE for any novel 
high-consequence pathogen 
No Yes 
* Based on historical local data and the Naylor report (10); HCW=healthcare worker; IPAC=Infection Prevention 
and Control; AGMP= Aerosol Generating Medical Procedure; ED=Emergency Department; PPE=personal 
protective equipment; ICP=Infection Prevention and Control Professional. 
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Figure 1.  Clinical trajectory and viral shedding of first confirmed case of Coronavirus 
Disease 2019.  Timeline chart illustrates the symptoms duration and the cycle threshold (Ct) 
values of the real-time reverse-transcriptase-polymerase-chain-reaction (RT-PCR) 
evolution. Lower Ct values indicate higher viral loads.  
 
